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Abstract We analyze contestants’ behavior in the game show “The Weakest Link”.
We focus on banking decisions, where a contestant chooses to secure an amount of
money for the eventual winner, or to risk it on a general knowledge question. We
find that contestants do not use the banking strategy that maximizes total expected
prize money. Average earnings could be at least 17% higher. Our results suggest that
contestants are not overconfident, but do try to convince other contestants that their
ability is higher than it really is, in order to increase chances of winning the prize.
We argue that this mechanism may also be applicable to other situations that are of
economic interest.
Keywords Game show · Field experiments · Signaling
1 Introduction
This article studies decision making in the context of a TV game show, The Weakest
Link. In this show, contestants repeatedly have to choose whether to secure (‘bank’)
an amount of money for the eventual winner, or to risk it on a general knowledge
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question. We test whether players use the optimal banking strategy. To do so, we study
the banking behavior of 693 contestants. First, we try to find some general patterns in
that behavior. Second, we test whether contestants use the strategy that maximizes total
prize money. Third, we investigate how contestants’ behavior systematically deviates
from that strategy. Our results suggest that, different from what an increasing body
of literature in psychology and economics suggests,1 contestants do not suffer from
overconfidence. Rather, they merely try to convince others that they have a high ability.
TV game shows form an ideal laboratory to study decision-making. The rules of
the game are well-defined, and the stakes are often substantial. A number of papers
have analyzed the behavior of contestants on game shows, for instance Berk et al.
(1996), Gertner (1993), Metrick (1995), and Beetsma and Schotman (2001). The show
The Weakest Link that we study has also attracted attention. Both Levitt (2004) and
Antonovics et al. (2005) use data from the voting stage of this game to test theories of
discrimination. Février and Linnemer (2006) study equilibrium selection in the final
stage of the game.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we give a full
description of The Weakest Link: the set-up, the decisions contestants have to make,
and other relevant issues. Section 3 gives some descriptive statistics of the episodes
we study. In Sect. 4, we investigate contestants’ banking behavior. We show that, on
aggregate, the contestants’ propensity to bank follows some simple and intuitive com-
parative statics: contestants are more likely to bank when questions are more difficult
to answer, when the amount at stake is higher, and when they have less general knowl-
edge.
In Sect. 5, we test whether contestants use the banking strategy that maximizes total
prize money. We show that an extremely simple decision rule could already have done
better on average. To get a handle on exactly how much better contestants could have
done by using the optimal strategy, we use a computer algorithm in Sect. 6. We find
that, first, contestants could have increased their earnings by at least 17% and, second,
that the intuitive comparative statics we found in Sect. 4 are not a part of the optimal
strategy.
Using our algorithm, we set out to study in Sect. 7 to what extent contestants’ behav-
ior differs from the optimal strategy. We find that during the first seven rounds of the
show, in an overwhelming majority of cases, contestants make ‘wrong’ decisions by
banking too late, rather than too early. In round 8, this picture changes and we observe
an overwhelming majority of cases where contestants bank too early rather than too
late. Yet, as we will argue, in round 8, contestants have no reason to try to convince
the others of their general knowledge, whereas in the first seven rounds they do have
such an incentive. We thus conclude that, on average, contestants of The Weakest Link
bank later than they should in an attempt to try to convince the other players that
they are more knowledgeable than they really are. In other words, contestants try to
signal to the other players that they are confident about their general knowledge. Yet,
contestants do not suffer from overconfidence: they do realize that they are not as
good as they suggest to be. We argue that this mechanism may also be applicable to
1 See e.g., Camerer and Lovallo (1999) or Bénabou and Tirole (2002) and the references therein.
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other situations that are of economic interest. In any situation where an individual is
evaluated based on his perceived quality, he may be inclined to take decisions that
are too risky, in the sense that they are the optimal choices of an individual of higher
quality. We give some examples in Sect. 8, which also concludes.
2 The game
The Weakest Link is a daily game show that has been broadcast by the British public
television network BBC since August 2000. It has rapidly become one of the most
popular game shows in the UK. Local versions of The Weakest Link are (or were)
shown in dozens of countries, most of them with virtually the same set of rules as
the UK version. Part of the success must be attributed to the unorthodox attitude of
the quizmaster. Instead of showing empathy and support, (s)he berates the contestants
throughout the show by giving sarcastic comments on their supposedly non-existent
intelligence and personal traits such as an odd hairstyle.
The show starts with nine contestants of whom only one will take home any prize
money.2 In every round, the contestants receive trivia questions. The players stand in
a semi-circle around the quizmaster. Each contestant receives one question at a time,
moving in clockwise order. A correct answer yields a ‘link’ in a ‘prize chain’, begin-
ning at zero and climbing to £1,000 in nine increments, as shown in Fig. 1. Whenever
a player gives a wrong answer, the chain is broken and all money on the chain is lost.
Questions are not more difficult to answer when the amount of money on the chain is
higher.
However, it is not necessary to reach £1,000 on the chain to secure winnings and
add to the prize money. Just before a contestant receives a question, he has the option
to ‘bank’ the money on the chain by saying the word ‘bank’. The amount on the chain
at that time is then added to the prize money, and the chain drops back to zero. After
banking, the contestant still has to answer a question. Of course, if the amount of
money on the chain is zero, there effectively is no banking decision to be made.
A round ends when time has run out. Any money on the chain that has not been
banked before the end of the round is lost. The first round lasts 3 min. Each subsequent
round lasts 10 s shorter than the preceding one up to round 7. In round 8, the two
remaining contestants have 90 s. A round may end before time is up when a total of
£1,000 is banked.3
As an example, consider the following chain of events in the first round. The first
contestant is posed a question and gives the correct answer. If contestant 2 banks, an
amount of £20 is secured. The chain moves back to 0. Now contestant 2 receives a
question. She answers correctly as well. Contestant 3 does not bank and gives the
correct answer. The chain has then moved to £50. Contestant 4 does not bank and
gives the wrong answer. The chain drops back to zero, and the money on the chain
is lost. Contestants 5 and 6 do not bank, but do give the correct answer, moving the
2 Note that the description in this section applies to the BBC shows we studied. Shows in some other
countries (including the US and the Netherlands) only have eight contestants.
3 If the amount banked in one round exceeds £1,000, the excess will not be added to the prize money.
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Fig. 1 The prize chain
chain back to £50. Contestant 7 banks, adding the £50 to the secured money, which
now stands at £70. At the end of a round, the amount of money secured in that round
is added to the total prize money of the show.
After each round, except round 8, the team gets rid of one player through a voting
procedure. The person with the largest number of votes receives one more sneer from
the host and is then sent home with the infamous words “You are the weakest link.
Goodbye!” In case of a tie, the person who answered the most questions correctly in
that particular round—the “strongest link”—casts the deciding vote, which may be
different from her original choice. The idea of the voting procedure is that contestants
should vote for the player they think is the worst among those remaining. This player
would be least likely to contribute much to the prize money.
Evidently, the voting procedure may induce strategic behavior. In round 7, for exam-
ple, with only three players left, there is a strong incentive for the two weaker players
to vote off the strongest link, giving them a greater chance of winning the final. Yet,
the trade-off is that prize money in the final round may be higher if the strongest player
is still in the game. To try to weaken this incentive for strategic voting, the amount
banked by the two players is trebled in round 8.
Each episode ends with the final, in which the two surviving contestants play against
each other head to head. The host alternately asks each contestant five questions. In
case of a tie after both players have answered five questions, more questions are posed
to determine who wins. The winner takes home the prize money accrued during the
eight rounds. The loser leaves with nothing.
3 Descriptive statistics
For this article, we watched 77 episodes of The Weakest Link, originally broadcast on
weekdays by the BBC in the period December 2000 through May 2001,4 relatively
early in the show’s history. For every episode, we recorded all voting decisions in every
round and for every question posed, the identity of the player answering, the amount
of time left on the clock just before a question was posed, whether the question was
answered correctly, and the banking decision. Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics
of our data set.
The probability of a correct answer is defined as the total number of correct answers
divided by the total number of questions. The propensity to bank is defined as the num-
ber of actual banks divided by the number of times contestants could have banked (i.e.,
the number of correct answers). Thus, on average, contestants bank in 29% of all pos-
4 Note that this period has far more than 77 weekdays. Some episodes broadcasted towards the end of our
sample period were reruns of earlier broadcasts. On public holidays, celebrity editions were often aired,
which we did not include in our data set. Also, the broadcasting schedule was sometimes interrupted to
show sports events instead.
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Table 1 Some descriptive statistics
Episodes 77
Questions per episode 164.74
Correct answers per episode 96.46
Number of banks per episode 28.34
Average prize money per episode £2,339
Minimum £1,080
Maximum £3,820
Average time per question 6.92 s
Probability of answering correctly 0.586
Propensity to bank 0.294
Average money earned per bank £75.40
Average money earned per correct answer £22.15
Average number of correct answers at bank 2.14
sible cases. The “average number of correct answers at a bank” equals the average
number of steps up the chain when a bank occurs. Thus, on average, there is a chain
of 2.14 correct answers when a contestant banks.
Note that the average time of 6.92 s per question is very short: during this time span
contestants not only have to listen to and answer their question, but also have to make
a banking decision. Moreover, they need to keep track of the performance of their
opponents. All of these, plus the fear of a ruthless putdown by the host of the show
in case of failure, imply that contestants are subject to considerable stress. This will
have an effect on their performance, both in answering the questions, and in making
banking and voting decisions.
Table 2 gives some additional statistics, broken up to individual rounds. As the
show progresses, it becomes more difficult to answer a question correctly. This may
be because the questions themselves become more difficult,5 or because players are
increasingly affected by stress and fatigue. For our analysis, this is immaterial. In
round 1, contestants managed to bank the maximum amount of £1000 in 17 episodes.
In round 2, this happened in three episodes.6 In later rounds, there are no such cases.
This article focuses on the banking decision, which is a non-trivial optimization
problem. A strategy of always banking late (i.e., if the amount on the chain is high) has
the potential of yielding high winnings, but also implies the risk of losing a substantial
amount of money if a wrong answer is given. A strategy of always banking early
implies that only little money will be earned per bank. Also, there is an option value to
5 Note that this does not contradict the earlier statement that, within a given round, questions are not more
difficult when the amount of money at stake is higher.
6 During our sample period, there seems to have been a change of policy with respect to the difficulty of
the questions in the first round. During the first 30 episodes in our sample, there has not been a single case
in which the £1000 target was reached in round 1. During the other 47 episodes, this occurred 17 times.
Such systematic differences are not found for later rounds.
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics per round
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Duration of round (s) 180 170 160 150 140 130 120 90
Probability of answering correctly 0.764 0.687 0.606 0.570 0.516 0.483 0.434 0.446
Average prize money 638 418 311 246 159 141 123 101
Minimum 90 40 20 50 0 0 0 0
Maximum 1000 1000 900 850 450 400 460 310
Occurrences of 1000 banked 17 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
banking late: doing so not only increases the amount of money currently on the chain,
but also allows contestants to reach even higher amounts on that chain.
Ultimately, the expected earnings of a single contestant in The Weakest Link depend
on the knowledge of all contestants, and on their banking and voting decisions. We
assume that the goal of a contestant on the show is to maximize these expected
earnings.7 It is conceivable that voting decisions are based on banking decisions of the
other players. Contestants may be more likely to vote for someone whom they feel to
use a non-optimal banking strategy. If this is the case, then banking decisions will be
chosen not only to maximize expected earnings, but also to influence voting decisions
of others, and hence to stay in the game. As our working hypothesis, we assume that
this is not the case. Thus, we assume that banking decisions are taken solely with the
aim to maximize expected earnings. Effectively, we assume that contestants take their
banking decisions as a group, since their objectives are perfectly aligned. Given that
the ultimate winner will take home all of the winnings and everyone has a positive
probability of being that winner, it is in each player’s interest that total prize money
is as high as possible.
4 An analysis of contestants’ behavior
We now take a closer look at the contestants’ banking behavior. We show that, at least
on aggregate, candidates behave according to the following intuitively appealing rules:
Result 1. Contestants in our sample of BBC episodes of The Weakest Link are more
likely to bank when
(a) the amount of money at stake is higher,
(b) questions are more difficult to answer,
(c) a player has less general knowledge.
Note that the first result makes intuitive sense: if the amount of money at stake is
higher, the amount of money lost if a wrong answer is given, is higher as well. Also,
7 Admittedly, other objectives may play a role as well, such as the desire to appear sympathetic or knowl-
edgeable on national television, to outsmart the host, etc. Yet, we assume that these objectives are only
minor compared to the prospect of potentially earning £10,000.
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Table 3 Propensities to bank
20 50 100 200 300
Round 1 0.051 0.186 0.426 0.545 0.587
Round 2 0.073 0.295 0.510 0.736
Round 3 0.108 0.321 0.611 0.732
Round 4 0.143 0.435 0.670
Round 5 0.161 0.507 0.800
Round 6 0.251 0.537 0.756
Round 7 0.314 0.605
Round 8 0.650 0.732
if the probability of a correct answer is lower, the probability that the money is lost
will be higher, so one could expect the number of banks to increase. The probability
of a correct answer depends on two factors: the difficulty of the question, and the gen-
eral knowledge of the contestant. Therefore, one could expect the number of banks
to increase when questions are more difficult, and when a contestant has less general
knowledge.
In Table 2, we saw that, over rounds, questions become more difficult to answer.
Hence, we expect that the propensity to bank at a given amount on the chain, is higher
in later rounds. Table 3 gives a breakdown of the propensities to bank, conditional on
both the round and the amount of money on the chain. For example, the top-left entry
indicates that there was a bank in 5.1% of all the cases where the chain was at £20 in
round 1. In the table, we have only included cells with at least 30 observations.
Conditional on the round, contestants do indeed bank more often when the amount
on the chain is higher. In every single row, the propensity to bank is increasing with
the amount of money at stake. Also, conditional on the amount of money on the chain,
the probability of banking is almost always higher for later rounds. This establishes
(a) and (b).
Given the limited number of questions many contestants receive, it is impossible
to assess the state of knowledge of all contestants in our sample. However, (c) does
imply that people that do not bank, are on average more knowledgeable. If this is true,
we should have that ceteris paribus, there are less correct answers after a decision to
bank, than there are after a decision not to bank.
Table 4 shows the relationship at the round level. Every column first gives the num-
ber of cases of a bank in that round, and then the number of cases of a no-bank, where a
bank would have been possible. Next, the probabilities of a correct answer conditional
on a bank and a no-bank are given. The last row tests for the statistical significance of
the difference between the two probabilities, using a χ2 test. It reports the p value on
the null hypothesis of no difference.
In every single round, the probability of giving a correct answer is higher after
a no-bank, which supports (c). Yet, using a χ2 test, we find that the difference is
significant at the 10% level only in rounds 2, 3, 6, and 7. In a test for the joint signifi-
cance of the eight individual test statistics, we find a p value of 0.060. We have also
tested our hypothesis on a more disaggregated level: conditional on both the round and
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Table 4 Relation between banking and answering questions correctly
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Cases of bank 295 275 234 234 196 189 180 214
Cases of no bank 1158 941 739 609 495 389 296 128
Prob. correct answer when bank 0.766 0.658 0.585 0.598 0.536 0.460 0.433 0.467
Prob. correct answer when no bank 0.800 0.716 0.650 0.629 0.549 0.537 0.514 0.484
p value 0.204 0.064 0.076 0.412 0.743 0.082 0.090 0.759
the amount of money on the chain. This yields 20 cells for which we have sufficient
observations to do a χ2 test.8 A χ2 test for the joint significance of the 20 individual
test statistics then yields a p value of 0.027. Thus, when looking at individual cells,
we find a relation that is significant at the 5% level. This establishes (c).
5 A benchmark strategy
In the previous section, we established some comparative statics with respect to con-
testants’ banking behavior. In this section, we go one step further, and test whether
contestants use the banking strategy that maximizes expected total prize money. To
do so, we choose an indirect approach.
Suppose that the contestants in a show always use an extremely naive strategy, by
always banking in round i if and only if some amount xi is on the chain. Clearly,
this cannot be the optimal strategy. Players then do not use any information on their
own knowledge, successes in earlier rounds, etc. However, if we are able to show that
following such a strategy yields higher prize money than what contestants actually
achieve on the show, we have unambiguously established that the strategy they use on
aggregate, does not maximize expected winnings. But this is indeed the case. We find
the following9
Result 2. Total prize money could have been substantially higher on average by using
the following benchmark strategy:
(a) bank at £200 during the first four rounds,
(b) bank at £20 during the last four rounds,
(c) bank at every opportunity during the last 15s of any round.
8 Details of these tests are available from the authors upon request.
9 This benchmark strategy was found by trying all possible strategies of this type for all the shows in our
sample. That is, for round 1, we have calculated what total prize money over all shows would have been if
contestants would have always banked if and only if the chain was at £20, what total prize money would
have been if they would have always banked if and only if the chain was at £50, etc. In round 1, it turned
out that over all shows the highest prize money would have been achieved if contestants would have always
banked at £200. For the other rounds, we did the same exercise. Details are available from the authors upon
request. The 15-s cut-off rule is somewhat arbitrary: the idea is that contestants should always bank when
time is about to run out, since if they do not have enough time to answer the question, the money is lost. A
10-s cut-off does not yield qualitatively different results.
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Table 5 Contestants’ performance versus benchmark strategy
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total
Money earned by contestants 638 418 311 246 159 141 123 101 2,339
Money earned with benchmark 648 455 317 267 203 175 144 116 2,555
Relative improvement (%) 2 9 2 9 28 24 17 15 9
Shows strictly beaten 39 42 38 39 64 53 53 38 58
Shows with equal performance 8 5 8 8 4 4 7 23 0
Shows strictly worse 30 30 31 30 9 10 17 16 19
Table 5 gives a summary of the relative performance of the benchmark strategy. We
report on the money earned by contestants, and the money they could have earned
using the benchmark strategy. The fourth row gives the number of shows in which
the benchmark strategy does strictly better, the fifth row the number in which it does
equally well, and the final row the number of shows in which it does strictly worse.
Overall, using the benchmark strategy would have lead to a higher amount of prize
money in 59 out of 77 shows. On average, our strategy would have earned the contes-
tants £2,555, an improvement of 9% over their actual performance.10
One could object to our methodology by arguing that we use the benefit of hind-
sight in determining the best naive strategy ex post. Yet, we do not believe that such
a criticism is valid. First, players on the show are able to use more information than
we can in deriving our benchmark strategy, such as cues with respect to the general
knowledge of their competitors, information of their performance in previous rounds,
etc. Second, suppose we split our sample in two subsamples of roughly equal size.
If we then use the same methodology to derive a benchmark strategy solely based
on the observations in the first subsample, we arrive at the same benchmark strategy
as mentioned above. Using that benchmark strategy, we can then improve upon con-
testants’ earnings in the second subsample. In that sense, our methodology thus also
improves earnings out-of-sample. Third, note that contestants have very little time
to determine their banking strategy during a round. Hence, they could save time by
deciding in advance to follow a very simple strategy, like the one we discuss here.
This strengthens our results.
6 A simulation of the optimal banking strategy
6.1 Methodology
In the previous section, we established that contestants do not use the optimal (i.e.,
prize-money maximizing) banking strategy. In this section we present an algorithm
that allows us to derive the optimal strategy, under some simplifying assumptions.
We use that algorithm to obtain further insight into the difference between actual
10 Note that the total amount does not equal the sum of the individual amounts of the previous rounds,
since prize money in the last round is trebled.
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and potential winnings, and, more importantly, to analyze how contestants’ banking
behavior deviates from optimal banking behavior.
Our algorithm proceeds as follows. Suppose that in some round, contestants will
receive T questions. For simplicity, suppose that this value is given and known in
advance. Assume that there still is time to bank after the last question has been
answered. Questions are numbered t = 1,…,T . At any point, the state of the chain
is denoted by s and the amount of money secured so far in this round is denoted
by k. Thus, at any point, s is the number of uninterrupted correct answers that has
been given before a contestant receives his question, and k is the amount of money
that has already been secured in this round. We thus have s ∈ {1, . . . , T } ≡ S, and
k ∈ {20, 40, 50, 60, 70, . . . , 1000} ≡ K . The amount that is added to the total when
the contestant banks, is denoted B(s). Thus B(1) = 20, B(2) = 50,… and B(s)= 1000
for s ≥ 9. The ability of the player that receives question t is denoted pt . This is the
a priori probability that this contestant will know the correct answer to a question in
that round.
The optimal strategy is solved using backward induction. First, consider question T .
We can calculate the expected amount of money that will ultimately be won in this
round if this contestant banks. That amount depends on the amount of money k secured
in this round, the current state of the chain s, and the ability of the current player pT . We
denote this expected amount as VB(T, k, s, pT ). Similarly, the expected prize money
that will ultimately be won in this round if the contestant does not bank, is denoted
VN (T, k, s, pT ). We have
VB(T, k, s, pT ) = (1 − pT )min{k + B(s), 1000}
+pT min{k + B(s) + B(1), 1000}, (1)
VN (T, k, s, pT ) = (1 − pT )k + pT min{k + B(s + 1), 1000}. (2)
The first expression can be understood as follows. If this player banks, the total
amount of money secured in this round moves from k to k + B(s), provided that
this amount does not exceed 1000. If she gives a wrong answer, which happens with
probability 1 – pT , then this also equals total prize money in this round. If she gives a
correct answer, which happens with probability pT , there will be a final opportunity
to bank after her answer, and the round total is k + B(s) + B(1), again provided that
this does not exceed 1000.
Now suppose this contestant does not bank. If she gives a correct answer, which
happens with probability pT , total prize money in this round will then be k + B(s +1),
provided this does not exceed 1000. Otherwise, the total for this round will simply
be k, hence (2). Conditional on the contestant making the optimal decision, the
expected payoff can be denoted
V (T, k, s, pT ) = max {VB(T, k, s, pT ), VN (T, k, s, pT )}. (3)
Consider question T − 1. Suppose the state of the chain is s. If the player receiving
a question banks, the expected amount of money that will be made during the round
(including this bank), is given by
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VB(T − 1, k, s, p) = pT −1V (T, min{k + B(s), 1000}1, pT )
+(1 − pT −1)V (T, min{k + B(s), 1000}, 0, pT ),
where we write VB as a function of all abilities, which we denote as p={p1, . . . , pT }.
This can be understood as follows. By banking, the amount of money secured increases
to k + B(s), provided this does not exceed 1000. The final contestant thus faces an
amount of money secured in this round equal to min{k+B(s), 1000}. With probability
pT −1, contestant T − 1 gives a correct answer, so the final contestant faces a state of
the chain that equals 1. Otherwise, the final contestant faces a state of 0.
Now suppose contestant T − 1 does not bank. The final contestant then faces an
amount of money secured in this round that equals k. With probability pT −1, contes-
tant T − 1 gives the correct answer, so the final contestant faces a state of the chain
of s + 1. Otherwise, contestant T − 1 gives the wrong answer, so the final contestant
faces state 0. Hence,
VN (T − 1, k, s, p) = pT −1V (T, k, s + 1, pT ) + (1 − pT −1) V (T, k, 0, pT) .
If contestant T makes the optimal banking decision, we have
V (T − 1, k, s, p) = max {VB(T − 1, k, s, p) , VN (T − 1, k, s, p)} .
Similar relations hold for any question t with 1 ≤ t < T . We thus have the following
recursive system:
VB(t, k, s, p) = pt V (t + 1, min{k + B(s), 1000}1, p)
+(1 − pt )V (t + 1, min{k + B(s), 1000}, 0, p), (4)
VN (t, k, s, p) = pt V (t + 1, k, s + 1, p) + (1 − pt )V (t + 1, k, 0, p), (5)
V (t, k, s, p) = max {VB(t, k, s, p), VN (t, k, s, p)}. (6)
This system can be solved for any vector of known abilities p.11 Given such an
ability vector, Eqs. (1)–(3) can be used to calculate V (T, k, s,p) for all possible states
(k, s), and given the ability vector p. Given that matrix, the matrices V (t, k, s,p) can
then be calculated using the system (4)–(6), for all t < T and again for all possible
states (k, s). Hence, at any point in time, given the amount of money on the chain, the
amount of money already secured, and the ability of all the contestants, this algorithm
uses backward induction to determine whether or not it is an optimal strategy for the
current contestant to bank. Of course, this does assume that all future contestants will
bank optimally as well.
Our algorithm now proceeds as follows. First, we determine whether the answer of
the first contestant is correct. We then move to the second player. If the first answer
was correct, the second contestant uses the algorithm above to determine whether
11 Note that, if there are two players left, one of them will receive all the even-numbered questions, and
the other one all the odd-numbered questions, so we have p1 = p3 = p5 = … , and p2 = p4 = p6 = ….
With three players we have p1 = p4 = p7 = … etc.
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or not to bank, by comparing VB(2, 0, 1, p) and VN (2, 0, 1, p). We then determine
the answer of this second contestant. Suppose she did not bank and gives a correct
answer. The third contestant then compares VB(3, 0, 2, p) and VN (3, 0, 2, p) in decid-
ing whether to bank. If the second contestant did bank and gave the correct answer, the
relevant comparison is that between VB(3, 20, 1, p) and VN (3, 20, 1, p). If the second
contestant did not bank and did not give the correct answer, the comparison is that
between VB(3, 0, 0, p) and VN (3, 0, 0, p). We then determine the answer of this third
contestant. This process continues until the last question is posed, or the contestants
have managed to bank £1000. For our simulation, we simply use the observed string
of correct and wrong answers from our dataset, in the way that it occurded in the round
and the show that we are simulating.
In the next subsection, we compare the expected earnings derived from our algo-
rithm with the earnings of the contestants in our dataset. That analysis will also serve
as a starting point for our analysis in Sect. 7, where we investigate the extent to which
the contestants’ behavior differs from the optimal banking strategy.
6.2 Comparing optimal strategy and contestants’ performance
In this subsection, we compare the contestants’ behavior with that prescribed by our
algorithm. To do so, we need an estimate of the individual abilities of the contestants,
which we use as an input for the algorithm. Denote the probability that player i gives a
correct answer in round j of show k as pi jk , with i ∈ {1, . . . , 9}, j ∈ {1, . . . , 8}, and
k ∈ {1, . . . , 77}. In our algorithm, we could use different abilities for each contestant
in each round of each show, letting the pi jks differ over i, j , and k. Yet, it is impossible
to obtain a reliable estimate for all those pi jks. Therefore, we assume that the abilities
of all contestants within a round in a given show are equal, but that these abilities differ
between shows, thus pi jk = p· jk , for all i, j, k. Also, we assume that these abilities
are equal to the observed fraction of correct answers in that show in that round.
We thus perform the following exercise. First, we look at round 1 in show 1. We
calculate the fraction of correct answers in that round. Then, we run our algorithm, set-
ting abilities of all players equal to that fraction, setting the number of questions equal
to the observed number of questions, and using the observed sequence of correct and
incorrect answers.12 We repeat the analysis with round 2 of show 1, and with all other
rounds in all other shows as well. This exercise yields for each round in each show the
true winnings, and the winnings according to our algorithm. Finally, we compare the
averages of these amounts over all shows. Table 6 summarizes our findings. We report
the performance of the contestants in the show (the column labeled ‘Cont’), and the
relative improvement of the simulated optimal strategy against the actual contestants’
performance.
12 Note that there is a problem if contestants have reached the £1000 before time has run out. For those
cases, we have estimated the total number of questions in that round as the number that would have been
reached had contestants continued to answer questions in the same speed as they had done so far. Also,
to allow for the cases in which contestants already reach £1000 after just nine questions, we put an upper
bound of 0.95 on the ability estimate that we use. All these shortcuts, however, have no discernible effects
on the results of our simulations.
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Table 6 Comparing strategies
Cont. Optimal Improve (%)
Round 1 638 +84 13
Round 2 418 +70 17
Round 3 311 +31 10
Round 4 246 +34 14
Round 5 159 +66 42
Round 6 141 +46 33
Round 7 123 +21 17
Round 8 101 +15 15
Total 2339 397 17
The results suggest that, by using the optimal banking strategy, contestants could
on average have improved upon total winnings by 17%. Admittedly, by deriving this
result, we do assume that players are able to correctly estimate the average ability of all
contestants. We also made the simplifying assumption that, within a given round in a
given show, all contestants have the same ability. In the real world, of course, abilities
do differ. Therefore, we have also investigated the effect of increased heterogeneity
in abilities.
To do so, we kept the average abilities in a given round in a given show constant,
but increased the variance of those abilities.13 In these simulations, we do not use
the actual answers, as we did above, but rather simulated answers: for each question
posed to contestant t , we draw a random number from a uniform distribution between
0 and 1. If this random number is less than or equal to pt , then this represents a correct
answer. In our simulations, we find that average earnings increase as the variance in
contestants’ abilities increases. This suggests that the results we report in Table 6 are a
lower bound on the true increase in average earnings when using the optimal strategy.
We thus have
Result 3. By using the optimal banking strategy, contestants could have increased
their total prize money by at least 17% on average.
6.3 The propensity to bank
To gain further understanding of the optimal banking strategy, we look at the pro-
pensities to bank in different scenarios. To do so, we looked at a large number of
simulations, again with simulated answers. We report the results in Table 7.
The column headings report the average ability pAV of players in a simulation.
Actual abilities are taken to be evenly distributed on [pAV − d, pAV + d], where d
is given by the number in the first column. The numbers in the cells then report the
average propensities to bank for different states of the chain, as observed in the output
13 Details are available upon request.
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Table 7 Simulated propensities to bank
0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70
0.00 20 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.042 0.000
50 na na na na 0.000 0.000
100 na na na na 0.001 0.001
200 na na na na 1.000 1.000
0.05 20 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.704 0.139 0.016
50 na na na 0.000 0.010 0.001
100 na na na 0.011 0.000 0.002
200 na na na 1.000 1.000 0.708
0.10 20 1.000 1.000 0.954 0.598 0.264 0.077
50 na na 0.000 0.174 0.098 0.017
100 na na 0.000 0.132 0.092 0.009
200 na na 1.000 1.000 0.867 0.552
0.15 20 1.000 0.989 0.776 0.538 0.293 0.119
50 na 0.000 0.449 0.275 0.146 0.050
100 na 0.000 0.329 0.252 0.173 0.076
200 na 1.000 1.000 0.971 0.749 0.496
0.20 20 1.000 0.826 0.630 0.510 0.296 0.147
50 na 0.644 0.524 0.321 0.164 0.083
100 na 0.474 0.411 0.306 0.199 0.105
200 na 1.000 1.000 0.897 0.647 0.484
of the simulations. Consider, for example, the entry (0.60, 0.10). For this case, we
performed 10,000 simulations with the following parameters: the number of contes-
tants equals 7, the number of questions equals 24, and the abilities of players are evenly
distributed on the interval [0.50, 0.70]. In these simulations, we observe a propensity
to bank at 20 that equals 0.598. Hence, out of all the possibilities of banking at 20 in
our simulations, we observe an actual bank in 59.8% of the cases.
Some patterns are worth mentioning. First, when abilities increase (or, equivalently,
as questions become easier to answer), we see that in most rows and for most values of
the amount of money on the chain, the propensity to bank decreases. This is also what
we observe in the behavior of contestants. Second, the observed propensities to bank
at 50 are virtually always lower than those at 20, different from part (c) of result 1.
This is due to two effects.
First, consider a case in which abilities of contestants are relatively high. In that
case, simulated contestants initially always bank at 200. However, once an amount
of 800 has been reached, or when the end of the round draws near, they switch to a
strategy of always banking at 20. Intuitively, this can be understood as follows. There
is an option value of not banking: not only does the money chain reach a higher amount
with a correct answer, but there also is the possibility of reaching even higher amounts.
This option value is lower if the amount of money secured is relatively high, and if
the number of remaining questions is low. In those cases, contestants have more of an
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incentive to bank already at lower amounts. This implies that, for the aggregate data,
we find a high propensity to bank at 20 and at 200, and a much lower propensity to
bank at intermediate amounts.
The second reason why banking at 50 is observed less often in the simulations than
banking at 20, is related to the way the money chain is designed. It is possible to show
that, in a case where all contestants have the same ability, rounds go on indefinitely,
and contestants use the banking strategy that maximizes their expected return per
question, banking at 50 or banking at 100 is never an optimal strategy, regardless of
the common ability that we assume.14 This effect is still discernible in the simulation
data, where the end-of-round and high-chain effects are taken into account.
Arguably, we therefore have that the propensity to bank at 50 and at 100 should
be lower than the propensity to bank at 20. Note, however, that this is not what we
observe in our real-world data. There, the observed propensities to bank are mono-
tonely increasing in the amount of money on the chain, as we observed in Sect. 4.
Apparently, contestants use an intuitively appealing rule that nevertheless is arguably
not a part of an optimal strategy. We have thus established the following:
Result 4. Consistently using a higher propensity to bank when the amount of money
on the chain is higher, is not a part of the strategy that maximizes expected total prize
money.
7 Do contestants bank too early or too late?
We have established that contestants in The Weakest Link do not use the banking
strategy that maximizes total prize money. If they would do so, they could increase
their earnings by at least 17%. We have thus established that contestants bank in the
‘wrong’ manner. Yet, we do not know exactly in which way they are ‘wrong’. In other
words, do contestants bank ‘too early’ or do they bank ‘too late’? In this section, we
try to answer that question. Banking too late would suggest that contestants are either
risk-loving or overconfident, in that they overestimate their ability of giving a correct
answer. Banking too early would suggest that contestants are either risk-averse or
underconfident.
We perform the following analysis. For every single banking decision in our data-
set, we use our algorithm to derive the optimal banking decision, given the amount
of money on the chain, the amount of money secured, the number of questions that
remain, and our assumption that ability of all contestants in a given round in a given
show are equal. Then, we compare our optimal banking decision with the decision
taken by the contestant. This allows us to classify every single banking decision into
one of four categories: correct banks (the contestant banks, and this is also the opti-
mal strategy), incorrect banks (the contestant banks, but the optimal strategy is not to
bank), correct non-banks, and incorrect non-banks. The results are given in Table 8.
The column labeled CB gives the overall number of correct banks in round 1 in our 77
14 Details are available upon request.
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Table 8 Classification of banking decisions
CB CN IB IN Over Under u/o
Round 1 77 1057 260 137 0.197 0.640 3.24
Round 2 60 838 267 136 0.242 0.694 2.87
Round 3 115 456 168 320 0.269 0.736 2.73
Round 4 131 325 150 320 0.316 0.710 2.25
Round 5 134 184 97 338 0.345 0.716 2.07
Round 6 148 128 85 281 0.399 0.655 1.64
Round 7 174 59 39 256 0.398 0.595 1.50
Round 8 191 39 83 98 0.680 0.339 0.50
shows, the column IB gives the number of incorrect banks, and CN and IN the number
of correct and incorrect non-banks, respectively.
Consider a case where, according to our simulation, a contestant should have
banked. If, in such a case, the contestant did not bank, then we can interpret this
as a bank that is ‘too late’: the contestant should have banked already, but did not do
so yet. Similarly, if there should be no bank, but the contestant did bank, then we have
a bank that is ‘too early’: the contestant should not have banked yet, but did do so
already. We define the fraction of overbanks as #IB/(#IB + #CN). It equals the fraction
of cases where contestants make the wrong decision, and the right decision is not
to bank. The fraction of underbanks is the fraction of cases where contestants make
the wrong decision, and the right decision is to bank: #IN/(#IN + #CB). Column 6
in Table 8 gives the fraction of overbanks in each round, column 7 the fraction of
underbanks, and column 8 the ratio of underbanks to overbanks.
Note that in rounds 1 through 7, the fraction of underbanks is overwhelmingly
higher than the fraction of overbanks. In round 1, the difference is by a ratio of more
than 3:1. This ratio monotonically decreases until round 7, where it is still 3:2. Yet, in
round 8, the picture dramatically changes. The fraction of overbanks is now double
the fraction of underbanks. We thus have the following:
Result 5. During the first seven rounds, ‘wrong’ banking decisions are primarily deci-
sions to bank too late. In round 8, ‘wrong’ banking decisions are primarily decisions
to bank too early.
Hence, in the first seven rounds, contestants often do not bank yet, when the optimal
strategy prescribes that they should. In round 8, this changes entirely. Contestants now
become much too conservative in banking. It is hard to believe that this is due to a
sudden shift from risk-loving to risk-aversion. Yet, it is equally hard to believe that
there is a sudden shift from overconfidence to underconfidence. Note however that
round 8 is a round in which the two remaining contestants merely play in order to
increase total winnings. After round 8, there is no voting stage. This suggests that con-
testants deliberately bank too late in earlier rounds, in an apparent attempt to convince
their competitors that they are confident in their ability, and fearing that banking earlier
would signal lower ability and hence a higher probability of being voted off. In round 8,
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when signaling is no longer necessary, contestants bank far too early on average. This
is inconsistent with overconfidence. It thus suggests that, indeed, signaling is the only
explanation for underbanking in the earlier rounds.
A signaling explanation would also suggest that as contestants have better informa-
tion about each other’s abilities, it becomes less of a necessity to try to convince the
other players of one’s own ability. Hence, one would then expect the relative number
of underbanks to decrease as the show progresses. This is exactly what we find.
An increasing body of literature in psychology and economics suggests that people
are overconfident when evaluating their own abilities (see e.g., Camerer and Lovallo
1999 or Nöth and Weber 2003). Bénabou and Tirole (2002) argue that rational agents
have an incentive to build self-confidence. One of the three reasons they list is that
self-confidence has a signaling value: “[…] believing oneself to be of high ability […]
makes it easier to convince others that one does have such qualities” (p. 877). Inter-
estingly, contestants on The Weakest Link also seem to try to convince others that they
are of high ability. Yet, our results suggest that they do not really believe themselves
to be of such high ability, since they do switch to overbanking in round 8. Camerer
and Lovallo (1999) predict that “in hierarchical tournaments where “winners” at one
level advance to the next level […] overconfidence will get stronger and stronger as
people advance.” (p. 316) We find that the opposite is true: as contestants advance, the
number of underbanks relative to overbanks decreases which, if anything, suggests a
decrease in overconfidence.
Note that the attempt to try to convince other players that one’s ability is higher than
it really is, does not necessarily have an effect on the other players’ perception of this
contestant’s ability. Indeed, rational players will take these incentives to signal into
account and discount them accordingly (see e.g., Mailath 1987). For the contestants,
such signaling is then a prisoners’ dilemma: they would all be better off if they could
commit not to signal in this manner.
8 Conclusion
In this article, we studied the BBC game show The Weakest Link as a field experiment
in decision making. We used the banking decision in that game, where a contestant
chooses whether to secure a certain amount of money for her team, or to risk that
money on a general knowledge question. In the latter case, should the contestant give
the correct answer, the amount of money available increases substantially. We tested
to what extent contestants make the optimal banking decision.
We established the following results. Contestants on this show are more likely to
bank when the amount of money at stake is higher, when questions are more difficult
to answer, and when a player has more general knowledge. These are simple rules that
seem to make intuitive sense. Yet, we also showed that a strategy that maximizes the
winner’s expected earnings will not yield such a simple monotone relation between
the amount of money at stake and the propensity to bank. Thus, although contestants
seem to obey such rules when making their banking decision, some of these rules do
violate the optimal strategy.
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We also showed that, as a group, contestants do not use the optimal banking strategy,
i.e. the banking strategy that maximizes expected total prize money. Using a computer
algorithm to derive the true optimal banking, we found that players’ average winnings
could have been at least 17% higher or £397 for the ultimate winner. This is just a
lower bound. We assumed players in a given round in a given show to be of equal
ability. An increase in the variance of those abilities further increases expected average
prize money.
In the first seven rounds, contestants systematically bank too late. The fraction of
underbanks is far higher than the fraction of overbanks. Yet, the ratio between the
two decreases over time. In round 8, after which no voting decisions are made, this
picture changes entirely. The fraction of overbanks now is far higher than the fraction
of underbanks. These observations seem consistent with the following story. Con-
testants deliberately bank too late, in an attempt to try to convince the other players
that they are confident in their ability to do well on the show. This incentive becomes
less prominent as the show progresses and contestants learn more about each other’s
abilities. In round 8, after which there is no voting decision, risk aversion becomes
the dominant consideration, leading contestants to over-rather than to underbank. Our
results suggest that contestants do not suffer from overconfidence. Yet, they do try to
convince others that they are better than they really are.
The mechanism we identified in this article may also be present in other situations
with uncertainty regarding agents’ capabilities. Consider for example the case of a
young economist who considers a suitable outlet for his work. First suppose that his
department (and/or potential future employers) will only be able to observe his actual
publication record. The choice of journal will then be a trade-off between the proba-
bility of acceptance and the quality of the journal. The interests of the economist and
his department are perfectly aligned. But now consider the case in which the depart-
ment can also observe where this economist submits his paper. In that case, he will be
inclined to send his paper to a better journal than he otherwise would, in an attempt
to signal that his quality is higher than it really is. The frequent rejections that will
result are suboptimal for the department as a whole. Again, just as we observed in
The Weakest Link, even though the incentives of the individual and the group seem
perfectly aligned, the desire to signal leads to a decision that is riskier than the first-best
solution.
As a final example, consider a firm that consists of a number of departments. The
manager of each department proposes and implements a risky project. The probability
that a project is successful, depends on the unobservable quality of a manager. The
remuneration and career opportunities of a manager implicitly depend on his perceived
ability. When the executive board can only observe whether or not a project is suc-
cessful, the interests of the firm as a whole and each individual manager are perfectly
aligned, and the manager will choose the project that maximizes expected profits.
But when the executive board can also observe the projects that are implemented, a
manager will be inclined to implement a riskier project than he otherwise would, in
an attempt to signal that his quality is higher than it really is. Also in this case, even
though the incentives of the individual and the group are perfectly aligned, the desire
to signal leads to a decision that is more risky than the first-best solution. We have
formalized this idea in Haan et al. (2008).
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On the basis of our analysis, it is hard to judge whether contestants on The Weak-
est Link behave rationally. On the one hand, they fail spectacularly to use the banking
strategy that maximizes total expected prize money. But on the other hand, our analysis
suggests that this may at least partly be due to the fact that they deliberately bank too
late, which may well be an equilibrium strategy in a signaling game where contestants
sacrifice prize money to try to convince other players that they have a high ability to
answer general knowledge questions.
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